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Ending Impunity: The Case for War
Crimes Trials in Liberia
Chernor Jalloht and Alhagi Marongtt
...............
Ab stract
This article argues that Liberia owes a duty under both international humanitarian and
human rights law to investigate and prosecute the heinous crimes, including torture, rape
and extra-judicial killings of innocent civilians, committed in that country by the warring
parties in the course offourteen years of brutal conflict. Assuming that Liberia owes a duty
to punish the grave crimes committed on its territory, the article then evaluates the options
for prosecution, starting with the possible use of Liberian courts. The authors argue that
Liberian courts are unable, even if willing, to render credible justice that protects the due
process rights of the accused given the collapse of legal institutions and the paucity of
financial, human and material resources in post-conflict Liberia. The authors then examine
the possibility of using international accountability mechanisms, including the
International Criminal Court, an ad hoc international criminal tribunal as well as a hybrid
court for Liberia. For various legal and political reasons, the authors conclude that all of
these options are not viable. As an alternative, they suggest that because the Special Court
for Sierra Leone has already started the accountability process for Liberia with the
indictment of Charles Taylor in 2003, and given the close links between the Liberian and
Sierra Leonean conflicts, the Special Court would be a more appropriate forum for
international prosecutions of those who perpetrated gross humanitarian and human rights
law violations in Liberia.
tB.A. (Guelph), LL.B., B.C.L. (McGill); Legal Counsel, Trade Law Bureau, Department of Justice
Canada; M.St. candidate and Chevening Scholar (Oxford); of the Editorial Board. E-mail:
chernor @ africalawinstitute.org.
ttLL.B. (Sierra-Leone), LL.M., D.C.L. (McGill); Legal Officer, International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda; of the Editorial Board. E-mail: alajimarong@yahoo.ca.
This article is dedicated to Saliu Oseitutu Jalloh and Sheriff Muhammed Marong, with love. For
providing excellent comments on an earlier draft, the authors thank Valerie Oosterveld, Julia Osei-
Tutu, Joseph Rikhof, and last but not least, Christopher Waters. The opinions expressed herein are
those of the authors alone. First published in Festus Aboagye & Alhaji M.S. Bah, eds., A Tortuous
Road to Peace: The Dynamics of Regional, UN and International Humanitarian Interventions in
Liberia (Pretoria: ISS, May 2005) 191- 228. Cite as: lAfr. J. Legal Stud. 2 (2005) 53-79.
© The Africa Law Institute. All rights reserved. AJLS is a free peer-reviewed and interdisciplinary
journal published by The Africa Law Institute. To download or comment on current articles, sign-up
for future issues or submit a manuscript, please visit <http://www.africalawinstitute.org/ajls>. AJLS is
indexed in CIAO Net, HeinOnline, Lexis-Nexis, ProQuest, Quicklaw and Westlaw.
lAfr. J. Legal Stud. 2 (2005) 53-79
That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as
well as upon states has long been recognized. Crimes against international
law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing
individuals who cor m it such crimes can the provisions of international law
be enforced.. 1
I. Introduction
This article discusses how accountability for serious crimes committed in Liberia
during the country's fourteen year civil conflict could contribute to civilian protection
and lay a foundation for a lasting peace based on the rule of law. The analysis is
carried out against the backdrop of the cessation of hostilities, which culminated in
the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ("CPA") 2 by the warring
parties in Accra, Ghana in August 2003 and the establishment of the National
Transitional Government of Liberia ("NTGL"). We argue that while the international
community's current pre-occupation with entrenching the newly-found peace;
ensuring the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants;
the provision of relief to internally displaced civilians; the return of displaced
Liberians from outside the country back to their communities and livelihoods; and
the establishment of an electoral process to return the country to full democratic rule
are well-placed and important, these processes are unlikely to lead to a durable peace
without an accountability process through which those who have committed
egregious crimes during the war would be brought to justice. Indeed, we posit that
accountability for violations of human rights and humanitarian law during Liberia's
civil war is integral to a lasting peace and national reconciliation for all Liberians.
Individual accountability for gross human rights abuses will also signal to potential
future violators that their actions will not go unpunished and therefore deter such
violations. In addition, bringing to justice those "bearing the greatest responsibility"3
for atrocities against innocent civilians in Liberia will add momentum to the fight
against impunity that the Special Court for Sierra Leone ("the Special Court")
initiated with the indictment of Charles Taylor in 2003.
The article proceeds from the premise that extensive human rights and
humanitarian law violations have been committed against the civilian population by
all sides to the Liberian conflict.4 According to Human Rights Watch, "[b]oth the
'Judgment of Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, (1947) 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals, 171.
2See Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia (GOL), The Liberians United for
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), The Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the
Political Parties, August 18, 2003, online:
<http:// www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_ 8182003_cpa.html> (last accessed: March 18,
2005).
3As used here, we are referring to the level of command authority and the gravity and scale of the
crime. Alternately, as was suggested by the UN Secretary-General in the Sierra Leone context, the
broader "persons most responsible" could be used to signify both a leadership/ authority position of the
accused and the gravity, seriousness or enormity of the crime. See Report of the Secretary -General on
the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/ 2000/915 (2000), paras. 29 - 31
["Report on the Establishment of the Special Court"].
4 Human Rights Watch, Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster- Violations of the Laws of War by all
Parties to the Conflict (New York: HRW, 1990) ["Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster"]; Liberia: Flight
from Terror - Testimony of Abuses in Nimba County (New York: HRW, 1990) ["Liberia: Flight from
Terror"]. For more recent accounts, see "Liberia: Greater Protection Required for Civilians Still at
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government of Liberia and Liberian rebel forces are responsible for violations of
international humanitarian law amounting to war crimes and other serious human
rights abuses. ... Recent human rights abuses committed by both sides include the
forced recruitment of children.., forced labor, assault and sexual violence against
civilians, as well as attacks on humanitarian workers. '5 Since fighting broke out in
1989, Armed Forces of Liberia ("AFL") troops and rebel groups such as the National
Patriotic Front of Liberia ("NPFL") and its splinter groups including the Independent
National Patriotic Front of Liberia ("INPFL"), and the United Liberation Movement
for Democracy in Liberia ("ULIMO"), deliberately targeted civilians and committed
large-scale torture, extra-judicial killings, rape, looting and destruction of civilian
property without military necessity or justification, conscription of civilians
especially children, and other gross human rights violations. This cycle of violence
and intimidation of civilians continued after Charles Taylor, leader of the NPFL, was
elected president in 1997 following disputed multi-party elections. Indeed a fresh
wave of fighting broke out with the advent in 2000 of a group calling itself Liberians
United for Reconciliation and Democracy ("LURD") which vowed to oust Taylor
from power by force of arms. LURD later gave birth to another splinter group - the
Movement for Democracy in Liberia ("MODEL") in 2003.
To contextualize our discussion on individual criminal responsibility, Part II
of the article will start with an overview of the more serious crimes committed during
the Liberian conflict and argue that those offences, and many others, so seriously
offend universal humanitarian norms and values that they render an international
legal response indispensable to any quest for a sustainable peace in Liberia. Part III
of the article will then explore the legal foundations of the humanitarian and human
rights law violations in Liberia and argue that an effective and durable peace cannot
be attained without holding key perpetrators accountable. We submit that, at a
minimum, the military and political leadership of the Doe and Taylor regimes, as
well as those of all rebel groups operating in Liberia from December 1989 to June
2003 should be brought to trial to answer for their individual acts or omissions and
to bear responsibility for the actions of their subordinates.
In Part IV, we evaluate various accountability options and make
recommendations on the most appropriate forum, legally and politically, in which to
prosecute those accused of war crimes in Liberia, taking into account regional and
sub-regional dynamics as well as recent institutional developments at the
international level, including the establishment of a permanent International
Criminal Court ("ICC"). While individual criminal responsibility is crucial in the
quest for civilian protection and lasting peace in Liberia, other accountability
mechanisms which are beyond the scope of this article, for example truth
commissions, may play an important role in facilitating Liberia's transition from
collective trauma to collective peace. In particular, a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission ("TRC") for lower ranking rebels, government soldiers, and child
combatants could identify those responsible, enable those individuals to publicly
Risk", A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper (September 2003) ["Greater Protection for Civilians"];
"Liberia's Human Rights Situation Still Precarious", HRW Press Release, November 1997; and Back to
the Brink: War Crimes By Liberian Government and Rebels - A Callfor Greater International
Attention to Liberia and the Sub Region, May 2002 Vol. 14, No. 4 (A), online:
<http://hrw.org/reports/2002/liberia/Liberia0402.pdf>(ast accessed: March 18, 2005).
5 Janet Fleischman, "Testimony Before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus on the Human Rights
Situation in Liberia" (July 9, 2003), online: <http://www.hrw.org> (last accessed: March 18, 2005).
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acknowledge and atone for their crimes and bring closure to surviving victims and
their families.
In addition, the establishment of a TRC for Liberia would assist to set the
historical record straight and promote forgiveness and reconciliation. However, a
TRC for post-conflict Liberia would be more effective if it complements rather than
serves as an alternative to prosecution. Part IV will also consider the status and effect
of the amnesty anticipated by the CPA and concludes that an amnesty granted under
domestic law will not extinguish Liberia's obligation to investigate and punish
serious international crimes. Finally, Part V offers some tentative conclusions
regarding a way forward in the fight against impunity in Liberia.
II. An Overview of Serious Human Rights Violations Committed in
the Liberian Conflict
A. Killing of Unarmed Civilians
The Liberian civil war can be roughly divided into two main epochs. 6 The first ran
from 1989 to 1990 and saw fighting largely between the AFL under then President
Samuel Doe on the one hand, and rebel militia under the leadership of the NPFL and
its various splinter and opposition groups. 7 The second period was from 2000 to
2003 during which Charles Taylor, having 'on' disputed elections in 1997,
converted his former rebel force into a ragtag army, and fought for control of
territory and the survival of his government against the newly formed LURD and
MODEL. 8 During both periods, all parties to the conflict adopted a deliberate policy
of targeting unarmed civilians who were killed, raped, tortured and sexually violated
on a routine bases. 9 We argue later on that this conduct by Liberia's warring factions
seriously violated international human rights and humanitarian law and that those
responsible ought to be held accountable for their actions.
There is evidence that after the initial attack by Charles Taylor's forces on the
village of Butuo, Nimba County in December 1989, the AFL forces, including the elite
Special Anti-Terrorist Unit, launched a major offensive aimed at crushing the
rebellion. During this attack, government forces deliberately killed civilians on a
large scale, targeting members of the Gio and Mano tribes who were accused of
complicity with the rebels. In response, NPFL rebels killed civilians belonging to
Doe's ethnic group, the Krahn. They also targeted Mandingoes for allegedly
informing the government of rebel activities in Nimba County.10 One report
6 The section relies extensively on evidence gathered by Human Rights Watch in various reports
prepared on Liberia. See reports cited in supra note 4. See also Human Rights Watch, How to Fight,
How to Kill: Child Soldiers in Liberia, Vol. 16 No.2 (A) March 2004 ["How to Fight, How to Kill"];
Amnesty International, Liberia: The Prom ises of Peace for 21,000 Child Soldiers (Al Index: AFR
34/006/2004), May 17, 2004; Liberia: One Year After Accra - Immense Human Rights Challenges
Remain (Al Index: AFR 34/012/2004) August 18, 2004; No Impunity for Rape -A Crime against
Humanity and a War Crime (Al Index: AFR 34/017/2004) December 14, 2004 ["No Impunity for
Rape"].
7These other groups include Prince Johnson's Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(INPFL), and at least two groups of rebels largely based out of Eastern Sierra Leone and calling
themselves ULIMO.
8 The latter was formed in 2003 after breaking away from LURD.
9 Jamie O'Connell, "Here Interest Meets Humanity: How to End the War and Support Reconstruction
in Liberia, and the Case for Modest American Leadership" (2004) 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 207, 215-216.
10 Liberia: Flight from Terror, supra note 4 at 2-5.
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explained that "NPFL rebels rocketed houses and shot people in their beds. Sick
people or the elderly who couldn't run were killed _"I'
LURD, MODEL and NPFL government forces committed similar atrocities
from 2000 to 2003. In northwest and central Liberia occupied by LURD during the
period, wide-scale extra-judicial killings were reported. In one incident, LURD
reportedly set a camp for displaced persons on fire to force them to leave. In Lofa
County and Gbarnga, men had to go into hiding for fear of being 'cut to pieces,
pieces, pieces' by LURD forces.1 2 A local woman from Gbarnga reported summary
executions of local men by LURD rebels in her area. In Buchanan, MODEL forces are
said to have killed and severely maimed the local population when the rebel group
first took over the town.13
B. Rape and other Forms of Sexual Violence
Rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls was a common
instrument of war used by all sides to the Liberian conflict.14 While there are
apparently fewer reported incidents of sexual violence during the first phase of the
conflict, this ugly side of the Liberian war was all pervasive following the resumption
of hostilities in 2000.15 Often, when government soldiers or rebel militia capture
territory, they would embark upon systematic rape either to show force, to intimidate
locals, to punish those who might have been suspected of supporting opposing
forces, or to facilitate looting and plunder. Women and girls of all ages, some as
young as five, others over fifty, were subjected to this brutal treatment. In many
cases, women were raped in the presence of their husbands or other family members
who are forced to watch. Such family members would then subsequently be killed.
Alongside rape of women and girl civilians during military offensives, rebel
forces and AFL troops forcibly recruited young girls to perform domestic chores and
serve as sex slaves. These "wives", as they came to be referred to in rebel parlance,
would typically be assigned to a male rebel commander or officer to serve as his
sexual partner in addition to her normal battle duties.16
C. Conscription of Child Soldiers17
While the use of children in armed conflict goes back to World War II when both the
Third Reich and underground movements resorted to large-scale use of children in
battle,1 8 in the post-World War II period, Liberia surely ranks among the worst users
of child combatants. According to United Nations ("UN") estimates, approximately
"1 Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster, note 4 at 2.
12 Greater Protection for Civilians, supra note 4 at 4.
13 Ibid. at 3-4.
14 Human Rights Watch, "The Guns are in the Bushes": Continuing Abuses in Liberia' (HRW Briefing
Paper, January 2003) ["The Guns are in the Bushes"] at 11- 12. See also No Impunity for Rape, supra
note 6.
15 Compare No Impunity for Rape, supra note 6.
16 How to Fight, How to Kill, supra note 6.
17 We adopt the definition under Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) that
children are persons below the age of eighteen years.
18 Ann Davison, "Child Soldiers: No Longer a Minor Incident" (2004) 12 Willamette J. Int'l L. & Disp.
Resol. 124 at 128 ["Davison, Child Soldiers"].
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15,000 children were involved in the Liberian civil war.19 Most of them were forcibly
recruited and then sent into training camps where they were either beaten or
drugged to commit various atrocities. Following the fresh bout of fighting in 2000,
all the key protagonists - the AFL, LURD, 20 and MODEL - widely used child
soldiers. Some of these children were as young as nine years old.
Over the course of the Liberian conflict, government forces and rebels
conscripted children whenever they took over territory from opposing forces or
during recruitment drives. 21 Other children were simply kidnapped from their
homes, on their way to school or the city, while others have 'volunteered' to join the
forces as the only means of protection and survival for themselves and their family,
or as a means of taking revenge for personal loss. Indeed the situation became so bad
during the rebel offensive against Monrovia in 2002 that parents in and around the
city stopped sending their children to school for fear that they would be kidnapped
and sent to the war front.
These children, both boys and girls, perform various tasks assigned by their
commanders including cooking, cleaning, fetching water, sex, and of course combat
duty. Many have died as a result. Others have endured serious physical and
psychological trauma. At the same time, child soldiers have committed numerous
horrible crimes during the war. Many similar stories including the commission of
other inhumane acts could be recounted but the above incidents illustrate the utter
brutality of the Liberian conflict.
III. Law Applicable to the Liberian Conflict
International humanitarian law and international human rights law both apply to the
conflict in Liberia. These two areas of law have evolved significantly in the past half-
century with the shared, if not always explicitly stated purpose, of protecting human
life and human dignity. 22 Essentially, the crucial distinction between the two is that
while humanitarian law is the lex specialis that applies in times of armed conflict,
human rights law applies at all times, including during conflict. At such times, the
two bodies of law overlap (though humanitarian law does not permit derogations for
special emergencies while human rights law does). But under both, States have
solemnly pledged to the individuals within their territories and to each other that
they will ensure that certain fundamental human security tenets would be protected.
As part of this, States undertake to punish those who violate those basic standards of
human decency within their territories. A failure to do so would attract some form of
responsibility for the State. The following sections will set out the main provisions
19 United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), "Up to 15,000 Child Soldiers in
Liberia, UN Says," September 24, 2003, online: <http://www.irinnews.org> (last accessed: March 18,
2005); Sarah L. Wells, "Crimes Against Child Soldiers in Armed Conflict Situations: Application and
Limits of International Humanitarian Law" (2004) 12 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 287 ["Wells, Crimes
Against Child Soldiers"]. See also Report of the Secretary -General on Children and Armed Conflict,
UN Doc S/2002/ 12999, 26 November 2002 (reviewing the progress in the protection of children
affected by armed conflict in respect of both States and non-state actors).
20 For instance, the UN listed LURD as a user of child soldiers in Liberia.
21How to Fight, How to Kill, supra note 6 at 8-9.
22Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, [July 9, 2004] General List No. 131, online: <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ idecisions.htm>
(last accessed: March 18, 2005) at 89-113; Ren6 Provost, International Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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from international humanitarian law and international human rights law that are
applicable to the conflict in Liberia.
A. International Humanitarian Law
The core of modern international humanitarian law was codified in the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977.23 The principal objective
of the Conventions, sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross
("ICRC"), was to set standards for the humane treatment of non-combatants or those
placed hors de combat by sickness, injury, weakness or surrender. The Conventions
reflected a desire to prevent and punish violations of universal humanitarian values,
in addition to the interests of individual States. 24 The grave breaches provisions
contained in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I therefore criminalize
violations of these humanitarian standards. 21 Customary international law now
recognizes that individuals responsible for grave breaches are subject to universal
jurisdiction. In other words, such individuals could be arrested and tried in any
country willing to do so, or surrendered to international judicial processes
established by States. 26 The acceptance of universal jurisdiction for grave violations
of the laws and customs of war is grounded on the notion that human society shares
certain common values, including respect for human life and dignity and the
inviolability of the rights of civilian women and children. Violations of these common
values anywhere offend human conscience everywhere, and thus, the whole of
humanity has an interest in suppressing and punishing them. 27
Geneva Convention IV, in particular, addressed the protection of civilians in
times of conflict. The overall objective is to temper the effects of war and to ensure
that civilians or, combatants no longer engaged in hostilities, are treated humanely
and with respect. The Geneva Conventions therefore prohibit killing defenceless
civilians or captured members of enemy forces, mutilation, cruel treatment, torture,
hostage taking, humiliating and degrading treatment, as well as summary executions
or trials conducted without judicial guarantees of fairness (Article 3). In addition to
these general protections, the Convention also contains a large number of provisions
relating to protection of children. 28
The humanitarian law protections enshrined in Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, the only aspect that applied to internal armed conflicts, were
23 The four Geneva Conventions relate to the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field (GC I); for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea (GCII); Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War (GCIII); and Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GCIV). Two Additional
Protocols were adopted in 1977. Additional Protocol I relates to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts; Additional Protocol II relates to the Protection of the Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts. In view of the subject matter of this Article, our principal focus will be
Geneva Convention IV and Additional Protocol II.
24 Liberia is a party to the four Geneva Conventions (March 29, 1954) and Additional Protocols I and II
(June 30, 1988).
25 Article 3, Additional Protocol I.
26 See Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann (District Court of Jerusalem) (1961)
36 Int'l L. Reps. 5.
27Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 284
["International Criminal Law"]. See also Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of ll April 2000,
online: <http://www.icj -cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm> (last accessed: March 25, 2005).
28 See Wells, Crimes Against Child Soldiers, supra note 19.
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further enhanced by Additional Protocol JJ.29 Together, these two instruments
embody the international humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed
conflicts.
Article 4 of Additional Protocol II sets out the fundamental guarantees for the
protection of all civilians in times of armed conflict. 30 The provision substantially
reflects Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and provides that all persons
who do not take part in hostilities, or who no longer do so, are entitled to respect for
their person, honour, convictions and religious practices. The provision enumerates
categories of prohibited conduct in respect of civilians including, violence to life,
health, and physical and mental well-being; murder; cruel treatment; torture;
mutilation and corporal punishment. Similarly prohibited are collective punishment;
hostage taking; acts of terrorism; outrages upon personal dignity; humiliating and
degrading treatment; rape; enforced prostitution; pillage and threats to commit any
of the foregoing acts. 31 Under Article 13, civilians shall be protected from the dangers
of military operations, and they shall not be the object of attack so long as they do
not take a direct part in hostilities.
The Protocol provides specifically for the protection and welfare of children
during internal armed conflicts. Parties to such conflicts are required to provide
children with care and aid, education, and to take steps to re-unite them with their
families. More importantly, it is clearly prohibited to recruit children below fifteen
years of age to take part in hostilities. However, where they do take part in hostilities
and are captured, the special protections provided under the Protocol continue to
apply to them. 32
Some scholars have argued that these provisions are inadequate for several
reasons: first, they fail to account for the special position of many child soldiers as
both victims and perpetrators; second, children who take part in hostilities lose the
general protections afforded to members of the civilian population even though some
of them might have engaged in hostilities against their own volition and; third, that
setting the age limit at which children could engage in conflict at fifteen years,
introduces an artificial distinction between children because most domestic
jurisdictions and international instruments recognize eighteen years as the age of
majority. 33
Liberia's Duty to Prosecute Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Historically, States have recognized that the apprehension and punishment of certain
types of criminals further the common objectives of the international community as
a whole. From the seventeenth century, customary international law has recognized
universal jurisdiction of States to arrest and try pirates because piracy was deemed to
affect the individual and collective interests of all States. By bringing pirates to
justice, the State exercising jurisdiction protected both its people and the collective
interests of all States in preserving free maritime navigation.
29 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non -International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977.
30 See also the prohibition of 'adverse distinction' which criminalizes the deliberate targeting of
particular members of the civilian population: Article 2, Additional Protocol II.
31 Article 4(2), Additional Protocol II.
32 Article 4(3), Additional Protocol II.
33 See Davison, Child Soldiers, supra note 18 and Wells, Crimes Against Child Soldiers, supra note 19.
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The normative underpinnings of universal jurisdiction shifted in the middle of the
twentieth century, when following World War II, the Allied Powers concluded an
Agreement in London to try the Major War Criminals of the European Axis. 34 The
Charter of the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, annexed to the London Agreement,
established individual criminal responsibility for crimes against peace, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity and provided that neither the official position, nor
governmental or superior orders, shall be a defence to any of the crimes within the
tribunal's jurisdiction. 35
Following the Nuremberg war crimes trials, the International Law
Commission compiled the principles of international law that emanated from the
trials. 36 Significantly, the Principles recognized the individual responsibility of
persons for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. They also
provide that the official position of perpetrators, whether as Head of State or
Government official shall not provide a defence, nor shall superior orders be a
defence.
It was partly in the interests of safeguarding these universal humanitarian
values that the UN Security Council established the ad hoc International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda ("ICTY' and "ICTR" respectively),
and collaborated with the Government of Sierra Leone to establish the Special Court
to bring to justice those suspected of committing serious violations of international
humanitarian laws. 37 The adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court ("Rome Statute")38 in 1998, and its entry into force in 2002, marks the latest
manifestation of the international community's determination to institutionalize
accountability for gross violations of international law.
The body of international humanitarian law contained in Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II has been integrated into the
ICTR Statute. Under the ICTR Statute, which addressed an internal armed conflict,
genocide is punishable under Article 2, crimes against humanity under Article 3, and
violations of both Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional
Protocol II are punishable under Article 4. The Rome Statute similarly confers
jurisdiction to try the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community, including war crimes under Article 8, irrespective of whether committed
in an international or internal armed conflict. Articles 3 and 4 of the Statute of the
Special Court also provides for individual criminal responsibility in respect of serious
violations of humanitarian law committed in an internal conflict.
This article assumes that the essential character of the conflict in Liberia
between 1989 and 2003 remained an internal armed conflict, even though at various
34 Agreement by United Kingdom, United States of America, France and U.S.S.R. for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major war Criminals of the European Axis, London 1945 82 U.N.T.S. 279
["London Agreement"].
35 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (The Nuremberg Charter) 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279,
Articles 6, 7, and 8.
36 Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Ntiremberg Tribunal and in the
Judgment of the Tribunal, UN Doc. / A/ CN.4/ SER.A/ 1950/Add.1 (1950); reprinted in Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 1950, vol. II. See in particular Principles 1, 111, and VI.
37 See UNSC Resolutions 808, 827 (1993), 955 (1994) and 1315 (2000).
38 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, Annex II, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998).
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times, international troops were actively engaged in hostilities. 39 We submit that this
limited international involvement, to the extent that it relates specifically to troops 40
from various States deployed by the Economic Community of West African States
("ECOWAS") and the UN, did not change the essential character of the Liberian
conflict, especially since both the ECOWAS and UN peacekeeping operations in
Liberia were motivated by the overriding concerns for humanitarian protection. 41
Assuming the Liberian conflict was essentially internal, it follows that the
conduct of all the warring factions, both government troops and rebel militia, was
subject to the provisions of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of
Additional Protocol II. In our view, the principles of individual criminal
responsibility, universal jurisdiction, the non-availability of official immunity and
superior orders as defences should apply to the perpetrators of crimes committed
during the Liberian war, despite the initial provenance of those principles in the
context of international armed conflicts. 42 This is particularly so because the
distinction drawn by the Geneva Conventions with respect to the duty to prosecute
and punish certain grave breaches is becoming less relevant, in view of the
evolutionary statutes and jurisprudence 43 of the international criminal tribunals
established by the UN in the 1990s and the development of a sharper accountability
sensitivity in the international community more generally (in large measure due to
the CNN factor). Moreover, when viewed from the raison d'tre of international
human rights and humanitarian law (i.e. protection of individuals in times of peace
and war), it becomes difficult to find a principled basis upon which to justify a
distinction between an obligation to prosecute or extradite in respect of grave
39 See Nicaragua v. United States of America (Merits) I.C.J. Rep. 14 (holding that for a conflict to be
deemed international, the foreign state must exercise "effective control" over the non-state party.
Effective control was interpreted to mean that the foreign state had to order the non-state party to
commit specific acts). For a different "overall control" test, see Prosecutor v. Tadic, (1999) Case No.
Case No.: IT-94- 1-A (ICTY, Appeals Chamber), online:
<http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/index.htm> (last accessed: March 18, 2005)
["Tadic"] at para. 120.
40 Human rights groups report that various African governments, for example Burkina Faso, Guinea
and Libya, supported some insurgent groups in Liberia. See Human Rights Watch, "Weapons
Sanctions, Military Supplies, and Human Suffering: Illegal Arms Flows to Liberia and the June-July
200 3 Shelling of Monrovia", A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, November 3, 2003, online:
<hi tp //hrw.orgi backgr, underi arms! iiberia/ liferia_1 arspdf> (lasi iccessed: Nairch 18, 2005).
41It may be that upon closer examination, especially given the alleged Burkinab6, Libyan and Guinean
support for Liberian rebel factions, the essential character of the Liberian conflict could change from
internal to (part) international thereby imposing a greater burden on Liberia to prosecute grave
breaches of international humanitarian law. See Tadic, supra note 39 at paras. 84 - 162.
42See ICRC, Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International
Humanitarian Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) ["Customary International
Humanitarian Law"] (identifying and highlighting the common core of humanitarian law applicable
to all parties during conflict; confirming that there is a customary international law duty to investigate
and prosecute serious humanitarian law violations committed in both international and internal armed
conflicts: Rules 156 and 157) at 568-611.
43 See also George H. Aldrich, "Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former
Yugoslavia" (1999) 90 A.J.I.L. 64, 67-68 and Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for
Human Rights Atrocities in International Law, Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997) at 91- 101.
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breaches in international, but not similar serious violations, in internal44 armed
conflicts. 45
The near universal criminalization of war crimes and their incorporation in all
the leading instruments of international criminal and humanitarian law strongly
suggests that they are part of customary 46 international law. 47 The fact that these
crimes reflect the common convictions and conscience of the majority of humankind
implies that States that engage in armed conflict have an obligation not to derogate
from humanitarian law norms. As a corollary to this obligation to abide by basic
humanitarian values, we also argue that States such as Liberia have an obligation to
apprehend and bring to justice those suspected of committing serious violations.
Where States fail or are unable to commence such prosecutions, they have an
obligation to render perpetrators to other national jurisdictions or international
judicial processes established to try suspected war criminals. This, we submit, is the
essence of the aut dedere aut judicare principle. 48 We further submit that recent
events such as ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, genocide in Rwanda, and
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States have sharpened international
sensitivity to serious crimes. This in turn has rendered States more responsive to the
need to try or extradite persons accused of serious criminal conduct at the
international level.
In sum, the obligation of a State such as Liberia to ascribe criminal
accountability for a small category of heinous crimes under international
humanitarian law is effectively mandatory both under international treaty and
customary international law. Thus, assuming that the parties adhere to the timetable
in the CPA, whatever new government assumes power in early 2006 would be
shirking obligations owed to the international community as a whole if it fails to
punish at least the top echelon who masterminded the horrendous crimes committed
during the course of the brutal conflict witnessed in Liberia in the nineties. 49
B. International Human Rights Law
The concept of human rights has been traced as far back as antiquity. However, it
was not until after World War II, beginning with the establishment of the UN in
1945, that the human rights movement came of age. As part of the core purposes of
44See T. Meron, "International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities" in Theodor Meron, ed., War
Crimes Law Comes of Age: Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 228 - 261.
45Contra Joseph Rikhof, "Canada and War Criminals: The Policy, the Program, the Results"
<http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/2004/Rikhof.pdf> (last accessed: March 18, 2005), 11 and J. Rikhof,
"Crimes Against Humanity, Customary International Law and the International Tribunals for Bosnia
and Rwanda" 6 N.J.C.L. 3,233-268 (arguing that there is no explicit duty to extradite or prosecute war
crimes during internal armed conflicts).
46See Nicaragua v. United States of America, supra note 39. For a recent and authoritative exposition
of the customary law status of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, see Customary
InternationalHumanitarian Law, supra note 42; see also T. Meron, "The Geneva Conventions as
Customary Law" (1997) 81 A.J.I.L. 348, 352-353.
47Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 42 at 553-554.
48 L. L. Sunga, The Emerging System of International Criminal Law: Developments in Codification
and Implementation (The Hague: Kiuwer Law International, 1997) 250-256; International Criminal
Law, supra note 27 at 284-298.
49We do not wish to suggest that perpetrators other than the top echelon should be absolved from
responsibility. Rather, our argument is that those bearing the greatest responsibility or those most
responsible should be brought to trial through international criminal processes.
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the new organization, the Member States of the UN pledged in Article 1(3) of the
Charter of the United Nations ("UN Charter") 50 to promote and encourage respect
for human rights. In Article 2(2), Members undertook to "fulfill in good faith the
obligations assumed" under the Charter. Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter then
committed all Member States to take action, whether jointly or separately, "to ensure
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language, or religion". 51 The subsequent
adoption of the International Bill of Rights, 52 starting with the landmark Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") in 1948, redefined the contours of the
relationship between States and individuals within their territories, and in the
process, elevated that relationship into binding commitments owed to the individual
and the international community as a whole. Thus, violations of the rights enshrined
in the International Bill of Rights entail responsibility under international law in
respect of both the aggrieved individual and in respect of other States.
The various instruments comprising the International Bill of Rights do not
impose a direct obligation on States to investigate, prosecute or redress human rights
violations. 53  However, the bodies established to monitor State compliance with
human rights treaty obligations, for instance the Human Rights Committee ("HRC")
established pursuant to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"), have required States to punish serious crimes such as torture and extra-
judicial executions. Treaty bodies have also asserted that States have a duty to ensure
that victims of human rights abuses and or their families receive reparations,
including compensation. This position is a logical corollary of victims' right to an
effective remedy for gross human rights abuses codified in key human rights
provisions such as Articles 8 of the UDHR 54 and 2(3) of the ICCPR. 55
50June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7. Liberia was a founding Member of
the UN. It voted for the adoption of the UDHR on December 10, 1948. Aside from the International
Bill of Rights, Liberia is party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (and its optional protocol); the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
["Banjul Charter"]. It has also signed, but not yet ratified, the three protocols to the Banjul Charter
establishing an African human rights court, elaborating the rights of African children, and the rights of
African women.
51 Articles 55 and 56, UN Charter.
52 Aside from the UDHR, the International Bill of Rights consists of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
its two Optional Protocols.
53Under Article 4 of the ICCPR, a state may derogate from its obligations to the extent strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such obligations are not inconsistent with its
obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination on any of the prohibited
grounds. Derogations are not permitted for core rights such as the right to life; right not to be subject
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; right not to be subject to
slavery; right not to be held guilty for an act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence,
under national or international law, at the time when it occurred.
54 While this instrument is a declaration, not a treaty, it is the foundation stone of the modern
international human rights. In any event, as the Preamble confirms, States intended for the UDHR to
"serve as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations". Today, the UDHR is the
yardstick against which compliance with international human rights norms is measured. See also
Louis B. Sohn, "The Human Rights Law of the Charter" (1977) 12 Tex. Int'l L.J. 129, 133-135 ["Human
Rights and the Charter"] (arguing that "The UDHR not only constitutes an authoritative interpretation
of the Charter obligations but also a binding instrument in its own right, representing the consensus of
the international community on the human rights which each of its members must respect, promote
and observe.")
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Under Article 2(1) of the ICCPR, a State shall respect and "ensure to all individuals
within its territory" the various rights contained therein. Article 2(2)56 obligates
States to undertake the necessary steps, including the adoption of legislative and
other measures, to give effect to the rights in the ICCPR. It is well settled in human
rights practice that the duty to ensure respect for rights generates both negative and
positive obligations for States. The HRC recently reiterated this position in General
Comment 3157 by noting that States must "refrain from violation of the rights
recognized, and any restrictions on any of those rights must be permissible under the
relevant provisions of the Covenant" (emphasis added). 58 This negative obligation
makes sense given that historically, but perhaps to a lesser extent now given the
marked increase of violence against individuals by armed non-State groups in
internal conflicts, the State and its agents were typically the primary source of
human rights abuses against individuals.
Whatever the case, States must also take positive steps, including the
adoption of "legislative, judicial, administrative, educative and other appropriate
measures, '" 59 to give practical meaning to their human rights treaty commitments.
We argue that among the 'other measures' envisaged by this provision, is the duty to
investigate and redress violations of human rights. Indeed, as the HRC has observed,
"the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully
discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of
Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or
entities" (emphasis added). 60 It follows that States such as Liberia will incur
international responsibility if they permit or fail to take appropriate measures to
prevent, investigate, punish, or redress the harm caused by private persons or
entities within their territories or effective control, even if not situated within their
territorial jurisdiction.
Furthermore, where investigations reveal violations of certain rights, the HRC
has maintained that States Parties to the ICCPR are obligated to "ensure that those
responsible are brought to justice". 61 As with a failure to investigate, "a failure to
bring to justice perpetrators '62 of human rights abuses is sufficient to give rise to a
separate breach of the ICCPR. In addition, the duty to investigate and to prosecute
mirrors the gravity of the violation so that a higher burden is placed on States
"notably in respect of those violations recognized as criminal under either domestic
or international law," including in particular, torture and similar cruel, inhumane
and degrading treatment, summary and arbitrary killing and enforced
55See also Article 6 of the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; Article 14 of
the 1984 Convention Against Torture; Article 39 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and
Articles 19 (3) and 68 (3) of the Rome Statute.
56 State reservations to Article 2 have been construed as incompatible with the objects and purposes of
the ICCPR. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24: Issues relating to reservations
made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to
declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, Fifty-second Session (1994).
57 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31[80]: The Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, Adopted on March 29, 2004 (2187th meeting)
["General Comment 31"].
58 General Comment 31, supra note 57 at para. 6.
59 Ibid. at para. 7.60Ibid.
61Ibid. at para. 18.
62Ibid.
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disappearance. 63 In the final analysis, as the HRC concluded, confronting impunity
for human rights abuses is a crucial aspect of any strategy aimed at preventing
recurrence of serious human rights violations.
Liberia's Duty to Prosecute Violations of International Human Rights Law
In the context of the current peace process, the CPA signed in Ghana reaffirmed
Liberia's commitment to human rights, in particular guarantees of basic civil and
political rights found in the UDHR as well as human rights principles enunciated by
the UN, the African Union, ECOWAS and under the laws of Liberia. As part of this
process, the parties undertook to ensure respect for the right to life and liberty,
freedom from torture, the right to a fair trial, freedom of conscience, expression and
association, and the right to take part in the governance of one's country.
Significantly, the parties also reaffirmed their commitment to abide by the norms of
international humanitarian law. 64
Liberia only formally became a party to many of the UN-sponsored human
rights instruments mentioned above in September 2004 - long after widespread
human rights violations were committed, especially by the rebels of the NPFL,
INPFL, ULIMO, LURD and MODEL. For this reason, positivist international
lawyers, who argue that no rule can be binding on States if they have not given their
express or implied consent, would likely object that the obligations contained in the
universal human rights instruments do not engage responsibility for Liberia since
the treaties only entered into force outside of the relevant period of the conflict. But
even positivists would agree that at a minimum, Liberia is required under Article 18
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 65 "to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose" of the human rights treaties that it signed before the
start of the war in 1989. Allowing agents of the State, and rebel groups operating
within its territory, who engaged in gross human rights abuses against innocent
civilians to go unpunished clearly frustrates the human security objectives of the
relevant rights treaties.
The human rights norms codified in multilateral treaties and their purposive
interpretation by treaty bodies serve as sources of binding legal obligations for
Liberia to investigate and prosecute serious crimes committed in its territory.
Customary international law, which is another source of law under Article 38(1)(b) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, generates equally binding
commitments for Liberia to do so consistent with the universal human rights treaties
because there are said66 to be sufficient State practice and opiniojuris67 for the duty
to investigate, prosecute and redress serious crimes to attach. 68 The virtually
63General Comment 31, supra note 57 at para. 18.
64 Article XII, CPA, supra note 2.
65 (1969) 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (in force January 27, 1980) ["VCLT"]. This treaty is considered customary
international law.
66 For an examination of whether there is such a duty, see, for instance, Diane F. Orentlicher, "Settling
Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime" (1991) 100 Yale L.J.
2537; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ed., Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995) ["Impunity and Human Rights"] and Juan E. Mendez,
"Accountability for Past Abuses" (1997) 19.2 Hum. Rts. Q. 255.
67 Essentially, opiniojuris is the conviction felt by states that a certain type of behaviour is required by
international law.
68 Though this rule is said not to apply to the so-called "persistent objectors".
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universal reach of the core human rights instruments, especially the International
Bill of Rights, and numerous UN declarations, resolutions, general comments, expert
reports and other documents have been cited as evidence of the status of customary
international law in this respect. On this view, a particular State need no longer
become a formal party to the core rights treaties for it to be bound by the obligations
contained in them because these rights are now a part of customary international
law.
Some distinguished international lawyers have gone much further to even
suggest that States are duty bound to at least the mandatory aspects of the
International Bill of Rights as a logical extension of the human rights obligations that
they assumed under the UN Charter. For instance, according to Louis Sohn:
Though the Covenants [i.e. the ICCPR and the ICESCR] resemble traditional
international agreements which bind only those who ratify them, it seems
clear that they partake of the creative force of the [UDHR] and constitute in a
similar fashion an authoritative interpretation of the basic rules of
international law on the subject of human rights which are embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations. 69
Aside from the UN-based treaties, Liberia's duty to investigate, punish and redress
the human rights violations committed in the course of the war also flow, without
any qualifications, from the Banjul Charter, 70 to which Liberia acceded in 1983.
Under Article 1 of that treaty, the parties "shall recognize the rights, duties and
freedoms enshrined" therein "and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other
measures to give effect to them." Article 2 entitles everyone "to the enjoyment of the
rights and freedoms" recognized by the Banjul Charter without any distinction.
Article 3 affirms everyone's equality before the law. Under Article 3(2), "Every
individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law". Article 4 reaffirms that
"human beings are inviolable" so that "every human being shall be entitled to respect
for his life and integrity of his person." It is clear that human rights would be devoid
of meaningful content if one, like the many innocent Liberians killed during the
conflict, could be arbitrarily deprived of the fundamental right to life.
Additional provisions in the Banjul Charter impose a duty on States Parties to
prohibit all forms of exploitation and degradation of individuals particularly slavery,
slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment (Article
5); to ensure that everyone can have his cause heard, including the right to an appeal
to competent national organs against acts violating fundamental rights guaranteed
by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force (Article 7(a)); to ensure that
everyone enjoys the right to national peace and security (Article 23(1)) as well as a
general satisfactory environment favourable to his/her development (Article 24).
In our view, all these fundamental rights would be violated if Liberia fails to
investigate and punish the serious crimes committed between 1989 and now. This
69 See Human Rights and the Charter, supra note 54 at 133-135.
70(1982) 211.L.M. 58 (adopted June 27, 1981; entered into force October 21, 1986). See U.O.
Umoruzike, "The African Charter on Human and Peoples'Rights" (1983) 77 A.JI.L. 902 and Vincent
0. Orlu Nmheille, The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practice and Institutions (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 200 1). In January 25, 2004, a Protocol to the Banjul Charter adopted in 1998 to
establish an African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights came into force, arguably a necessary
extension to bolster Africa's feeble rights protection regime.
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position is supported by the jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and
People's Rights ("the Commission"). 71 Indeed, under the jurisprudence of the
Commission, Liberia is not only obligated under the Banjul Charter to investigate
and punish the perpetrators of serious crimes, it must also provide reasonable
compensation to the victims and/or their families. 72
As the Banjul Charter does not permit any State derogations from human
rights treaty obligations, whether during civil wars or other emergencies, we note
finally that a failure to fulfill the rights discussed above may attract legal
consequences for Liberia, whether through the Individual-State human rights
complaint mechanisms authorized by Articles 56 to 58 of the Banjul Charter, or
through the State-to-State complaints mechanisms under Articles 47 to 53. Unlike
other regional human rights systems, in the African system, Liberians as well as non-
Liberians, groups of individuals or NGOs could all initiate cases against the
government alleging violations of the Banjul Charter. Complainants need not even be
related to the victim(s) to have standing before the Commission. In addition, the
procedure to initiate cases is simple enough that it could be undertaken without the
assistance of lawyers.
On the other hand, the State-to-State complaints mechanism in the Banjul
Charter has rarely been invoked by African governments to compel scrutiny of
another State's human rights record. 73 Furthermore, because decisions of the
Commission are not binding upon States, they have in most cases not been
implemented or observed by African governments. But even with their limited direct
impact, it remains true that Commission decisions play a vital role in advancing the
cause of human rights in Africa because they often serve as a method of monitoring
respect for human rights on the continent; establishing an accurate historical record
(particularly when governments participate in the proceedings); collecting
information that could be used by later investigators (whether from within the
country or from abroad); mobilizing shame by publicizing credible information
about gross human rights abuses; contributing a body of human rights jurisprudence
that would no doubt be useful for the planned African Court of Human and Peoples'
Rights; and by providing, where governments abide by the decision, much needed
relief for the victims and/or their surviving families.
Overall, as the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Liberian government
owes a duty under Africa's primary human rights instrument to investigate,
prosecute and remedy the serious violations of international law that were
committed against its population. In addition, this duty also attaches for Liberia in
respect of the International Bill of Rights to the extent that it is bound by those
71The African Commission was established under the Banjul Charter and is based in The Gambia. The
Commission's web site is online: <http://www.achpr.org/> (last accessed: March 18, 2005).
72 Among the leading cases are Commission Nationale des Droits de 'Homme et des Libertes v. Chad,
Comm. No. 74/92; Amnesty International, Comit6 Loosli Bachelard, Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, Association of Members of the Episcopal Conference of East Africa v. Sudan, Comm. No.
48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93; and Mouvement Burkinab6 des Droits de 'Hom me et des Peuples v.
Burkina Faso Comm. No.204/ 97, online:
<http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/allcases.html> (last accessed: March 18, 2005)
(discussed below).
731t appears that only one State-to-State human rights complaint has been launched by an African
country in almost two decades of existence of the Banjul Charter. It was initiated by the Democratic
Republic of the Congo against Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda in February 1999. Even that case
appeared to be motivated by political considerations instead of human rights protection.
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obligations at customary international law. In any event, as party to the Geneva
Conventions and its Additional Protocols, it cannot escape the fundamental
obligation to prosecute those who masterminded, directed or aided and abetted
certain particularly heinous crimes such as torture, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and possibly, genocide.
Experience from elsewhere strongly suggests that a failure to heed the pleas
for justice for the over 200,000 victims of the grave crimes witnessed in the country
could undermine Liberia's transition to a society founded on justice and the rule of
law and effectively send the message that perpetrators are above the law. This would
allow a culture of impunity, rather than a culture of accountability, to fester.
Furthermore, while a policy of forgive and forget may in the short-term appear to be
one way of cementing the fragile peace, by leaving the military and security forces
unscathed and unrepentant, it undermines long-term stability and the foundation of
the rule of law by increasing the likelihood of a resurgence of human rights abuses
against innocent civilians. 74
IV. Potential Mechanisms for Accountability in Liberia
So far, we have argued that Liberia owes a duty under both international
humanitarian and human rights law to prosecute at least the key perpetrators of the
widespread human rights abuses witnessed in that country in the 1990s. We now
explore the menu of accountability mechanisms available to Liberia 75 and the
international community to ensure that justice is done, and seen to be done in
Liberia. As will be seen shortly, a number of possibilities for prosecutions appear to
exist in Liberia and internationally. Since States have a primary responsibility to
ensure the enjoyment of human security by individuals within their jurisdiction,
including the duty to conduct investigations, undertake prosecutions and mete out
just punishment to gross violators of human rights, we start by examining possible
venues for prosecution within Liberia. This accords with the prevailing view among
States, as confirmed by Article 17 of the Rome Statute, that international
involvement in domestic accountability efforts should be employed as a last resort
when the local justice system is unable or unwilling genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution.
A. Domestic Courts
The Liberian Constitution provides for an independent third branch of government
comprised of a Supreme Court and such other subordinate courts as may be
established by the legislature. 76 Aside from the five-member Supreme Court, which is
the highest court with final appellate jurisdiction over all criminal and Constitutional
matters, the Liberian court system provides for criminal courts, an appeals court and
magistrate courts. Magistrate and traditional courts sit in the country's fifteen
74See Impunity and Human Rights, supra note 66 at 281-282.
75The ensuing analysis assumes that the desired political will exists for prosecutions to take place on
the part of any new government inaugurated in 2006 and on the part of the international community.
76Four Constitutions have been adopted since Liberia was founded, online:
<http://onliberia.org/con index.htm> (last accessed: March 23, 2005). The most recent, and
currently in force, was adopted in 1986.
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counties. Generally, the statutory courts apply statutory law while traditional courts
apply customary law.
Under the Constitution, judges are appointed by the President subject to the
consent of the Senate. They hold office during good behaviour till mandatory
retirement at age seventy. 77 Article XXVII of the CPA provides that the structure of
the judicial organ in Liberia shall remain unchanged. However, immediately upon
the installation of the NTGL, all judges of the Supreme Court were deemed to have
resigned. New appointments were to be made by the Chairman of the NTGL and
approved by the members of the transitional legislative assembly.
In the normal course, it would be preferable for prosecutions to take place in
Liberian Courts. There are several reasons for this. First, because the courts are
located in the country where the crimes took place, this eases prosecutorial
investigations, facilitates the collection and presentation of evidence, reduces the
cost of prosecution and ultimately assists in securing justice for all. Second, because
the presence of local investigators and courts at the scene of the crime increases local
engagement of and participation in the accountability process. Increased local
engagement in turn leads to greater understanding of and confidence in the
outcomes of trials. It may also result in increased public support and legitimacy for
the trials, both of which are vital for long-term societal healing and reconciliation.
In theory, Liberia could use its domestic courts to prosecute perpetrators of
serious crimes in the country. The Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocols apply in the country under conventional international law. Domestic courts
could also invoke customary international (including humanitarian) and treaty law
to try offenders. 78
The possibility of prosecutions in Liberian courts raises an important issue
regarding the international legal status and effect of any amnesties that may be
accorded by the transitional government, or for that matter a subsequent
government, to perpetrators of grave crimes committed during the conflict. In
particular, would any grant of amnesty serve as a bar to prosecution of international
crimes?
The Amnesty Question
The rationale for amnesties is that when used properly, they may help contribute to
the cessation of hostilities, reintegrate displaced civilians and former combatants
into society, and promote post-conflict reconciliation. 79 Support for grants of
amnesties can be found in Article 6(5)80 of Additional Protocol II of the Geneva
Conventions. Proponents of amnesty tend to argue that amnesties are a necessary
77The appointees must be citizens of Liberia; in addition, for the Supreme Court, five years legal
practice experience is required while for lower courts 3 years experience would suffice.
78For example, torture is a separate treaty-based crime. See Ahcene Boulesbaa, The U.N. Convention
on Torture and the Prospects for Enforcement (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1999) (assessing the
efficacy of the Torture Convention as a means of enforcing the right to be free from torture).
79Report of the Secretary -General on The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Situations, UN Doc/ S/2004/616 (2004) at para. 32 ["SGRule of Law Report"].
8 Article 6 (5) of Additional Protocol II states: "At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall
endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed
conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are
interned or detained."
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evil if the international community is to succeed in eradicating the spate of violent
internal conflicts in various parts of the world.
In the Liberian context, Article XXXIV of the CPA provides that the interim
government "shall give consideration to a recommendation for general amnesty to all
persons and parties engaged or involved in military activities during the Liberian
civil conflict that is the subject of this Agreement". Interestingly, the only obligation
that appears to flow from the text of Article XXXIV is giving consideration to the
recommendation for a general amnesty to all persons and parties to the Liberian
conflict. There is no obligation that the "recommendation" as such be accepted. The
language used was likely a result of poor drafting instead of the actual intent of the
parties.
While as of this writing we are not aware of any such amnesties granted by the
NTGL, the broad language of Article XXXIV strongly suggests that the parties expect
to preclude, at some point before the inauguration of an elected government, any
accountability for perpetrators of gross human rights violations. Though the peace
accord reaffirmed the commitment of the various armed groups to respect for human
rights and humanitarian law, it also impliedly adopts in this provision a posture that
is fundamentally inimical to those values. Significantly, Article XXXIV did not limit
the amnesty to, for example, political offences or senior level commanders of the
respective armed groups or to a specific time-period of the Liberian conflict.
In our view, the legality and legitimacy of an amnesty for crimes committed in
Liberia would turn on its nature (whether conditional/unconditional), timing, scope
(the kinds of crimes it purports to amnesty), and the legitimacy of the government
purporting to grant it. With respect to legality, a blanket amnesty for unspeakable
atrocities committed in Liberia is likely illegal under international law and definitely
contradicts recent UN practice, including with respect to Liberia, insisting that
amnesties are not permissible for serious international crimes. 81
In an important jurisprudential contribution, the Appeals Chamber of the
Special Court, relying on Article 10 of the Statute of the Special Court, has also held
that the amnesty granted under Article IX of the Lom6 Peace Agreement by the
Sierra Leonean government does not bar the prosecution of the various accused
before the Special Court for international crimes committed before July 1999. The
Appeals Chamber reasoned that because of universal jurisdiction, "a State cannot
bring into oblivion and forgetfulness a crime, such as a crime under international
law, which other States are entitled to keep alive and remember". 82
Given the controversy surrounding amnesties, the ICRC also recently clarified
the customary law status of amnesties. The ICRC endorsed Russia's explanation of
its vote on Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II that the provision could not be
construed to enable war criminals, or those guilty of crimes against humanity, to
escape punishment. 83 Significantly, the ICRC concluded that "Such amnesties would
also be incompatible with the rule obliging States to investigate and prosecute
persons suspected of having committed war crimes in non-international armed
81 For instance, the UN Secretary-General stated in a recent report that "United Nations-endorsed
peace agreements can never promise amnesties for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or
gross violations of human rights", see SGRule of Law Report, supra note 79 at para. 10.
82See Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon, Brima Bazzy Kamara, Case No.SCSL-2004-15-PT, Case No.SCSL-
2004-16-PT, Lom6 Amnesty Decision, online: <http://www.sc-sl.org/RUF-decisions.html> (last
accessed: March 18, 2005) at para. 67.
83Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 42 at 611-614.
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conflicts. '84 The ICRC cited evolving international practice as evidence of the
incompatibility of amnesties with the duty to investigate/prosecute international
crimes and violations of non-derogable human rights.
Overall, as confirmed by the Special Court and the ICRC, irrespective of the
amnesty granted under Liberian law, it would not preclude prosecutions for
international crimes. Indeed, we could go even further to argue that in the case of
most of the jus cogens crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and
torture, 85 a government purporting to grant amnesty would be acting illegally under
international law.
With respect to the legitimacy of an amnesty, the transitional government,
which apparently enjoys the support of the UN and ECOWAS, is comprised largely of
leaders of the various rebel groups that had de facto control over certain parts of
Liberia at the time the peace conference in Ghana was convened. While it may
represent the best hope for peace in Liberia now, the transitional government clearly
does not enjoy a democratic mandate derived from the people of Liberia. Thus, it
lacks the legitimacy to grant blanket amnesties to former combatants who are in one
way or another responsible for the slaughter of over 200,000 civilians. Such a self-
serving amnesty would likely meet with strong opposition from the scores of
Liberians that have directly or indirectly borne the brunt of the war.
In any event, the reality is that Liberian courts do not currently have the
human, financial and infrastructural resources necessary to render credible justice
that complies with due process requirements, particularly in respect of the rights of
the accused, under international human rights law. The country's already weak and
dilapidated judicial system has essentially been rendered nugatory by years of
conflict. Indeed, according to the United States Department of State, while Liberian
courts functioned sporadically over the past few years, the government "was unable
to revitalize the court system outside of Monrovia due to the war and a lack of
trained personnel, a lack of infrastructure, and inadequate funding. '86
Furthermore, some judges and magistrates lacked any legal training, though
the Constitution requires legal education, membership in a bar and at least three
years of experience as a legal practitioner for judicial appointments. The legal and
judicial systems are also characterized by a lack of proper equipment or supplies, as
well as a safe and secure environment free of intimidation in which judicial functions
could properly be performed. Moreover, judges and magistrates, most of whom have
not been paid by the government for years, routinely exact fees from parties
appearing before them to cover living and operating expenses.
At the same time, the defense bar, which normally acts as an additional
bulwark against trampling upon the rights of accused persons by the State, or errant
84 Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 42 at 612.
855ee Prosecutor v. Anton Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/ 1-T (ICTY, Trial Chamber) (holding that a
domestic amnesty law would not prevent prosecution of the jus cogens crime of torture before an
international tribunal, foreign state, or in the torturer's home state under a subsequent regime) online:
<http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/trialc2/judgement/index.htm> (last accessed: March 18, 2005)
at para. 155. Ajus cogens norm is a higher form of international law accepted and recognized by the
international community of states as a norm from which no derogation is permitted. It overrides and
supersedes lesser international law norms that conflict with or seek to modify it. See Articles 53, 64, 71
of the VCLT, supra note 65.
86 See Country Report on Human Rights Practices (2003), United States Department of State (March
18, 2004), online: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27735.htm> (last accessed: March 18,
2005).
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judges, apparently routinely encourage their clients to buy favourable decisions. 87 In
such a discredited legal environment, the fundamental human rights, including due
process guarantees enumerated in the Constitution and international human rights
law, are unlikely to be effectively enforced by the Liberian Courts.
While legal considerations are crucial in the calculus of post-conflict peace-
building, the question whether to prosecute human rights abusers in Liberian courts
would also in part depend on a range of other variables, including an evaluation of
the nature and severity of the crimes committed, the number of individuals and
groups involved in their commission, the level of political support enjoyed by
whatever government is elected in the fall of 2005 (and even prior regimes, including
that of Taylor), the timing of the prosecutions and an assessment of the strength of
governmental and civil society institutions in potentially absorbing, without
provoking a relapse into conflict, the inevitable fall outs from prosecution.88 It would
also be critical that whatever prosecutions are undertaken are done in a balanced and
even-handed manner, especially since the line between perpetrators and victims
during the conflict are blurred (including the role of specific groups such as
children). In addition, proponents on all sides of the conflict could probably claim,
with some cogency, a "rough equivalence" 89 of human rights outrages upon the
civilian population in the course of fourteen years of vicious conflict.
In view of the devastation of legal institutions and structures in Liberia, such
as the judiciary, the police, and prisons, as well as the paucity of material resources,
it is unrealistic to expect that a new government would be able to pursue trials in
domestic courts, together with the urgent need to rebuild the Liberian State and
society politically, and economically. For all these reasons, we conclude that under
current circumstances, Liberian courts lack the requisite independence, as well as
the human and material resources, to serve as a suitable venue for prosecutions of
the kinds of egregious crimes committed during the war.
B. International Criminal Court
In the last decade, the international community has significantly stepped up its
efforts in the struggle against impunity. This includes providing alternative venues
for prosecution where States are unable or unwilling to pursue human rights
abusers, as is arguably the case in Liberia. The establishment of freestanding
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, hybrid or
mixed tribunals for Sierra Leone and Cambodia, panels for serious crimes in Kosovo
and East Timor constitute evidence of a welcome shift at the global level, towards
greater individual accountability for serious violations. However, it was adoption of
the Rome Statute establishing a permanent ICC that was the crowning achievement
of the post-World War II criminal accountability movement.
With jurisdiction complementary to that of States, the ICC is premised, as
stated in the fourth recital of its preamble, on the conviction that "the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community must not go unpunished and that
their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level
87 The US State Department put it thus: "Defense attorneys often suggested that their clients pay a
gratuity to appease judges, prosecutors, and police officers to secure favorable rulings", ibid. "Denial of
Fair Public Trial".
88 See factors enumerated in Impunity and Human Rights, supra note 66 at 282.
89Ibid. at 28 1.
Ending Impunity
lAfr. J. Legal Stud. 2 (2005) 53-79
and by enhancing international cooperation". Under the Rome Statute, four crimes
are punishable before the ICC: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
aggression (Article 5). The first three crimes were defined (Articles 6, 7, 8
respectively) and elaborated upon through the elements of crimes (Article 9) while
aggression was left to be defined by the Assembly of States Parties (as per Articles
121, 123). A State Party to the ICC accepts jurisdiction in respect of these four crimes
(Article 12.1). In addition, the ICC may also assert jurisdiction for crimes committed
on the territory of the State in which the conduct occurred or the State of registration
of the vessel or aircraft (if the crime was committed on a vessel or aircraft) or a State
of which the person accused of the crime is a national (Article 12).
In keeping with its complementary jurisdiction, a case before the ICC would
be rendered inadmissible a) if it is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which
has jurisdiction, unless that State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution; b) where a jurisdiction bearing State has investigated
but decided not to prosecute; c) if the person concerned has already been tried, or d)
the case is not of sufficient gravity to warrant further action by the Prosecutor
(Article 17).
The crimes committed in Liberia include at least two (crimes against
humanity and war crimes), and possibly a third (genocide), of the four within the
ICC's jurisdiction. 90 This would have made the ICC a perfect venue for Liberia to
refer to the ICC Prosecutor requesting him to investigate the situation to determine
whether one or more persons should be charged for crimes within the jurisdiction of
the ICC (Articles 13(a) and 14).91 However, two factors make this practically
unfeasible. First, Liberia only became a party to the Rome Statute in September
2004, long after members of the respective armed groups committed the bulk of the
crimes discussed early on in this article. Second, the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC
is limited to crimes committed after the entry into force of the Rome Statute (that is
to say, July 1, 2002), again, long after the commission of most of the grave crimes
documented in Liberia.
That said, for the various crimes committed by rebels and AFL forces in the
outskirts of Monrovia, Liberia's capital, during hostilities between July 2002 (entry
into force of Rome Statute) and September 2004 (Liberia's ratification), the Security
Council acting under its Chapter VII authority, with or without the consent of
Liberia, 92 could trigger investigations by the ICC Prosecutor (Article 13(b)). Absent
action from the new government, if the ICC Prosecutor does not initiate
investigations proprio motu to pursue crimes within ICC jurisdiction committed in
Liberia (Article 13(c) and 15), Security Council action would represent the only hope
for a credible criminal investigation and ascription of responsibility for the egregious
human rights abuses committed in Liberia.
In the current climate in which the Security Council appears to be focused on
working with the parties through the UN Mission in Liberia ("UNMIL") to restore
90Liberia signed the Rome Statute on July 17, 1998 and ratified it on September 22, 2004. It is unclear
whether Liberia accepted ICCjurisdiction backdated to the entry into force of the Rome Statute (July
2002) or whether it only accepted jurisdiction forward from the point of ratification (September
2004).
91The time of alleged commission of a particular international crime would be crucial to the
determination of the kinds of charges that could be laid by an ICC Prosecutor, or another international
prosecutor for that matter, in the context of the Liberian conflict.
92See Michael P. Scharf, "The ICC's Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of
the U.S. Position" (200 1) 64 Law & Contemp. Probs. 67.
Jalloh and Marong
order, to facilitate the transition to peace through the conduct of democratic
elections, and to establish programs to assist in rebuilding basic infrastructure, it
appears that the necessary political will does not exist at the international level for
accountability to take place in Liberia. In addition, due to United States opposition to
the ICC, referral action is unlikely to emanate from the Security Council. Indeed,
human rights NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have
consistently called for prosecutions of crimes committed in Liberia. However, the
position of the UN on accountability in Liberia appears to be ambivalent with only
periodic statements of support for prosecutions, 93 including in the Chapter VII
resolution 94 establishing UNMIL. Still, it appears that there is relatively greater
silence on the accountability question from the UN in the Liberian context, unlike
the approach advocated by the same body in the case of neighbouring Sierra Leone.
In addition, while the Security Council can clearly refer cases to the ICC
Prosecutor, there is nothing in the Rome Statute to suggest that the Prosecutor owes
a duty to proceed with charges against individuals following the conclusion of his
independent investigation(s). Much of the Security Council's (political) energy
recently appears to be focused on human rights violations in the Sudan (and even in
the Sudan, it was only after much political pressure from the human rights
community and the strong backing of some permanent Members did the Security
Council finally adopt the historic resolution referring the situation to the ICC
Prosecutor for investigation). The above factors, taken together, make prosecutions
before the ICC for crimes committed in Liberia a less viable option.
C. International or Hybrid Court for Liberia?
Assuming that there would be the requisite political will to deal with the two main
practical limitations to ICC investigations (i.e. the time of commission of crimes in
Liberia and the ICC's temporal jurisdiction), the international community could
establish a special criminal tribunal for Liberia. Three options would in theory
appear to exist: 1) use of an ad hoc tribunal similar to the ICTY and ICTR; 2) use of
an independent hybrid court (similar in structure to that in Sierra Leone) and 3) the
establishment of a panel (East Timor, Kosovo) or extraordinary chambers
(Cambodia) within Liberian courts.
While the momentous contributions of the ICTY and the ICTR to human
security and global rule of law cannot be measured in mere dollars and cents, the
sheer costs of those two accountability projects, which together consume almost
about a quarter of a billion dollars each year (representing about 15% of the UN
Budget), may make the first option impractical. 95 It is also widely acknowledged that
the international community has expressed concern about the pace and number of
prosecutions. This leads us to consider whether hybrid courts (nationalized
93For example, see, The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Press Release March 24, 2003.
941n UNSC Resolution 1509, the Security Council "deplored the violations of human rights, particularly
atrocities against civilian populations, including widespread sexual violence against women and
children .. ". It also noted that it was "mindful of the need for accountability for violations of
international humanitarian law" committed in Liberia.
95See also Antonio Cassese, "The Role of Internationalized Courts and Tribunals in the Fight Against
Impunity" in C. Romano, ANollkaemper and Jann K. Kleffner, eds., Internationalized Criminal
Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 1-
13 (arguing that "we should rule out the establishment of future ad hoc tribunals similar to those for
the former Yugoslavia, or for Rwanda.") at 12.
Ending Impunity
lAfr. J. Legal Stud. 2 (2005) 53-79
international criminal courts) or a panel for serious crimes or extraordinary
chambers within Liberian courts (internationalized national courts) would provide a
viable alternative.
With respect to the possibility of an independent nationalized tribunal for
Liberia, that would appear highly unlikely in view of the political difficulties cited
above, tribunal fatigue at the Security Council, including the paucity of resources for
existing tribunals such as the Special Court, the need for resources for the pending
Cambodia tribunal, and a solidification of the ICC (which is not fully yet established
internationally). In addition, a nationalized hybrid court would require that there be
at least an effectively functional and adequately resourced judicial system in Liberia.
As we argued above, that does not currently exist. 96
On the other hand, an internationalized court, along the lines of the Special
Court, would be freestanding and less dependent on national institutions. But such a
court, while relatively cheaper when compared to the ICTY and ICTR, would still
require strong financial backing which cannot be taken for granted, as demonstrated
by the experience of the Special Court. Only time will tell whether such backing can
be secured from the Security Council as currently constituted and bearing in mind
the policy posture regarding international criminal tribunals by some of its
permanent members.
D. Prosecutions by the Special Court for Sierra Leone
On January 18, 2002, the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone signed an historic
agreement 97 establishing a Special Court for Sierra Leone. The Special Court,
authorized by Security Council Resolution 1315 in August 2000, is mandated under
Article 1 of its Statute "to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for
serious violations of international humanitarian law." 98 The Special Court is also
empowered to utilize national law to prosecute those accused of masterminding the
crimes committed in Sierra Leone during a decade of brutal armed conflict. For a
number of reasons that have been justifiably criticized by the human rights
community, the temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court is limited to crimes
committed after November 30, 1996, though the vicious Sierra Leone war dates back
to March 1991.
The subject matter jurisdiction of the Special Court include crimes against
humanity (Article 2); violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (Article 3); other serious violations of
international humanitarian law (Article 4); and crimes under Sierra Leonean law
(Article 5).
As we argued above, it appears unlikely at this point that the international
community will establish a free-standing criminal tribunal for individual criminal
96 On the other hand, the UN did resuscitate and put on life support the judicial and legal systems in
East Timor and Kosovo to enable some war crimes trials that have been criticized for non-compliance
with international human rights standards. Given the resources and time required for such a task, we
do not think the UN will undertake this in the Liberia case, despite the UN's ongoing law reform efforts
in Liberia.
97Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, signed on January 16, 2002, online: < http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-
agreement.html> (last accessed: March 18, 2005).
98Statute of the Special Court, annexed to the Agreement (January 16, 2002), online: <http://www.sc-
sl.org/scsl-statute.html> (last accessed: March 18, 2005).
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accountability in Liberia. Aside from encouraging domestic prosecutions within
Liberia, which we have argued is not feasible in view of Liberia's decimated legal
system, the international community could decide to empower the Special Court in
neighbouring Sierra Leone to try a small number of individuals bearing greatest
responsibility or most responsible for the heinous crimes committed in the course of
the Liberian conflict. While we have maintained that there may not be sufficient
political will to establish a separate hybrid court for Liberia because of cost
considerations, those concerns would dissipate to a large degree by using this already
established tribunal. There are also various legal, political and pragmatic reasons
why the international community could choose to pursue this option, which in any
event, is definitely better than no prosecutions at all.
First, aside from the subject matter jurisdiction which could be tailored to
meet the needs of Liberia (both in respect of the use of international law and
domestic (Liberian) law, if need be), it is clear that the temporal jurisdiction of the
court will not suffer from the limitations we discussed earlier in respect of the ICC.
The Special Court's current statute, which would presumably be amended by Sierra
Leone and the UN with the participation of a democratically elected Liberian
government, could address crimes that go as far back as the start of the Liberian war
in 1989.
Second, there is an obvious link between the armed conflicts that engulfed
Liberia and Sierra Leone. 99 This includes the fact that both conflicts started within
two years of each other and that both were fuelled, if not rooted, in a desire by a few
greedy men to plunder their society's natural resources for their own personal
purposes (diamonds in the case of Sierra Leone and rubber and timber in the case of
Liberia). The personnel (mostly child soldiers), light weapons and slash and burn
tactics that were used by the warring sides also mirrored each other and reflected, in
both countries, an almost unprecedented level of human savagery. It is also
undisputed that some of the combatants have fought in both countries. In addition,
given the similarities of the crimes committed, investigators from the Special Court
who are already familiar with the nature of the crimes committed in Sierra Leone
and the local terrain could build on their experiences to almost immediately start
collecting and preserving evidence that would be needed for prosecutions on Liberia.
Third, it would be much cheaper for the international community to expand
the mandate of an already functioning judicial tribunal to try a small number of
individuals instead of building a new one from the ground up. This is so because,
among other things, the requisite infrastructure (offices, court house, law library,
etc.), staff (including judges, prosecutor, registrar, investigators, etc.), rules of
procedure and cooperation agreements with international bodies such as INTERPOL
are already in place. There is, to put it simply, no need to reinvent the wheel.
Fourth, using the Special Court to try Liberian war criminals would in the end
help ensure the development of a more coherent body of international humanitarian
law through an expanded common appeals chamber, as is done at the ICTR.
99The link between the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts is well documented. See, for example,
Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000),
Paragraph 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone UN Doc/S/2000/ 1195 (2000); Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie
and Ralph Hazelton, The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds, & Human Security (Complete
Report) (Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, 2000), online: http://www.partnershipafricacanada.org>
(March 18, 2005). See also the recent report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.
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Furthermore, all the concerns about overburdening the judges of the appeals
chamber, about difficulties that may arise from one tribunal's use of varied sources of
law and the use of a different official language which caused the Secretary-General to
recommend that the Special Court have a separate chamber instead of sharing that of
the ICTY/ICTR, as was initially suggested by the Security Council, do not arise in this
situation.100 Indeed, while there is currently one appeals chamber for the Special
Court with five judges, the court only has about 9101 indictees before it (though a few
more indictments are expected). This suggests that there may be scope for an
increase in the workload of the judges, if accompanied by opening up of a third and
even fourth trial chamber. Importantly as well, the membership of the Appeals
Chamber could be increased to reflect the one or two additional trial chambers that
would be added to try the Liberian cases.10 2
Fifth, by using the Special Court, the international community could train
Liberians in the proper administration of justice, especially if a certain percentage of
the staff positions, including judicial ones, are pegged specifically for nationals of
Liberia as a way of rebuilding the capacity of the local legal system. That could
provide a long-term legacy that would live on long after prosecutions are concluded
and will likely assist in the restoration of the rule of law in Liberia.
Sixth, and finally, as we noted in the introduction to this article, the Special
Court has already started the accountability train for Liberia through the
Prosecutor's release of a seventeen-count indictment against Charles Taylor in June
2003. Taylor, who started the Liberian war in 1989, was sitting president at the time
of his indictment. The indictment alleged that he had committed serious
international crimes in Sierra Leone including crimes against humanity, war crimes
and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. The indictment
variously accused Taylor of responsibility for terrorizing Sierra Leonean civilians,
unlawful killings, sexual and physical violence, use of child soldiers, abductions,
forced labour, looting, burning, and attacks on peacekeepers and humanitarian
assistance workers.
On July 23, 2003, counsel for President Taylor and Liberia filed a motion
before the Trial Chambers of the Special Court seeking an order 1) to quash the
Indictment; 2) to nullify the warrant of arrest; and 3) for provisional measures
restraining service of the indictment and arrest warrant on Taylor. The ground for
the motion was that Taylor should enjoy absolute immunity from criminal
proceedings under customary international law as the sitting Head of State of Liberia
at the time of his indictment. In any event, according to counsel for Taylor, the
Special Court lacked jurisdiction over Taylor because it was a national not
international tribunal.
In yet another historic jurisprudential contribution, the Appeals Chamber
rejected those arguments. Though its reasoning was wanton in some important
respects, the Appeals Chamber ruled unanimously that the Special Court is an
international criminal tribunal with an international mandate exercising jurisdiction
'
00Report on the Establishment of the Special Court, supra note 3 at paras. 40-46.
'
0 1Two other indictees are at large while two more are dead.
102 Existing concerns regarding serious delays due to lack of funding and personnel in the Chambers of
the Special Court would first have to be addressed. See Human Rights Watch, Bringing Justice: the
Special Court for Sierra Leone Accomplishments, Shortcom ings, and Needed Support Vol. 16, No. 8(A)
September 2004, online: <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sierraleone0904> (last accessed: March 18,
2005).
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over international crimes.10 3 Thus, the official position of Taylor as incumbent Head
of State of Liberia at the time of his indictment is not a bar to his prosecution.
Indeed, the Appeals Chamber concluded, Taylor was and still is subject to criminal
proceedings before the Special Court.
While Taylor is currently enjoying impunity in Nigeria, it is clear that there is
a desire on the part of most Liberians (and Sierra Leoneans) for him to be brought to
justice. Thus, it would be critical that the Special Court, with an amended statute, be
empowered to try war crimes in Liberia under a Chapter VII resolution so that
Nigeria or any other State harbouring alleged war criminals could be compelled to
either extradite that person to the Special Court or prosecute them. That is the only
way in which the international community would ensure that justice is done.
In view of the current political climate, the concern that prosecutions through
Liberian courts would not meet minimum international human rights standards, and
the limitations inherent in pursuing prosecutions through the ICC, we submit that
the Special Court is the most suitable venue for justice to be served in Liberia.
Significantly, the use of the Special Court appears to be the preferred option of
Liberian civil society.104
V. Conclusion
There must be no selectivity, no sanctuary, no impunity for those guilty of
gross human rights violations.10 5
This article has argued that Liberia owes a duty under international law to
investigate, prosecute and redress the victims that have suffered from the heinous
crimes, including torture, rape, extra-judicial killings, recruitment of child soldiers,
attacks against peacekeeping personnel and innocent civilians, committed in that
country in the course of fourteen years of vicious internal conflict. That duty, we
argued, is firmly grounded in international humanitarian law as codified in the
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, the bulk of which are also now
customary international law. We further argued that, if necessary, Liberia could and
should investigate and punish specific treaty-based crimes such as torture and
genocide, all of which are jus cogens crimes that do not require a nexus to armed
internal conflict for prosecution.
The article also made a second argument that was rooted in international
human rights law. In this respect, we argued that there exists an additional duty for
Liberia to take steps to address impunity, which duty we traced to authoritative
interpretations of international treaties to which Liberia was a signatory though
those would only apply, in view of the country's recent formal party status, if those
instruments can without doubt be said to be customary international law. This is
important to ensure that the fundamental principles of legality and the prohibition
103For an analysis of the Taylor decision, see C. Jalloh, "Immunity from Prosecution for International
Crimes: The Case of Charles Taylor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone"ASIL Insights (October
2004), online: <http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh145.htm> (last accessed: March 18, 2005).
104See Festus Aboagye and Alhaji M. S. Bah, "Liberia at a Crossroads: Apreliminary look at the United
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the protection of civilians", ISS Paper 95 (November 2004),
online: <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/papers/95/Paper95.pdf> (last accessed: March 18, 2005) at 13.
'
05Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Address: "Human Rights
and the International Criminal Court" Caracas, Venezuela, November 30, 2000.
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on retroactive application of criminal legislation are absolutely adhered to. On the
other hand, it is clear that under the Banjul Charter, Africa's main human rights
instrument, and the way the obligations contained therein have been interpreted in
the jurisprudence of the Commission, there is an unequivocal treaty-based duty for
Liberia to punish, at a minimum, the senior architects of the atrocities that led to the
senseless slaughter of over 200,000 persons, at least half of whom were civilians.
Assuming arguendo that there is indeed a duty, we catalogued the kinds of
crimes that have been witnessed in Liberia and evaluated the options for criminal
prosecution. In so doing, we started with Liberia, the country with primary
responsibility to protect its civilian population, even during conflict. While noting
that amnesties may be granted in respect of domestic crimes, conditioned on their
compatibility with the letter and spirit of international human rights law instruments
to which Liberia is a party, we submitted that Liberia would run afoul of current UN
practice which has reaffirmed repeatedly that States may not grant amnesties in
respect of international crimes. We also argued that a TRC could help individualize
guilt and therefore promote national reconciliation. Ultimately, however, truth
without accountability would establish a shaky foundation for the rule of law in post-
conflict Liberia.
Having exhausted the majority of domestic options, we then turned to
potential international accountability mechanisms. In this regard, we began with an
examination of prosecutions through the ICC, broadened the discussion to cover the
jurisdictional and political limitations inherent in the use of that forum before
considering the possibility of stand alone ad hoc international criminal and hybrid
courts. All of these were found to be not politically viable in view of cost
considerations and the current preoccupations of the UN, especially the Security
Council. However, we concluded that a middle ground could be reached to ensure
that accountability takes place in Liberia through use of the existing Special Court in
neighbouring Sierra Leone, which has already started prosecution of the biggest fish
in the sea of human rights abusers in Liberia: Charles Taylor. Of course, the Special
Court's basic instruments would have to be amended to make this possible. In
addition, the Special Court would require new resources - human, financial, and
material - and a more robust Chapter VII authority to compel third States such as
Nigeria to hand over senior perpetrators, for example, Taylor.
In sum, it should be clear from this article and other contributions in this
volume that law and order completely broke down in Liberia in the decade of the
nineties. Liberian authorities therefore owe both a legal and moral duty to take
action to confront the abusers and to put potential perpetrators on notice that
outrageous conduct will not permitted or condoned. It is important that African
governments and the international community weigh in to express global
condemnation by supporting an accountability process for the heinous crimes
committed in Liberia. The Special Court would be a logical choice, in particular
because it enjoys the support of some Liberians. In the final analysis, accountability
in Liberia is a threat to impunity everywhere.10 6
'
06With apologies to Martin Luther King Jr. who said that "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere".
